Redstate

By RHD Posted in User Blogs — Comments (4) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

Mark Steyn has an interesting piece in the current issue of the City Journal, titled Facing Down Iran -- Our lives depend on it.  (It's available on RealClearPolitics and is well worth reading.)  Steyn's argument was as incisive as ever. The basic point he makes in the City Journal article, and has been making for some time elsewhere, is that the Iranian problem isn't going away by wishing it were so, and won't be resolved in any useful or acceptable means except by the credible threat, and perhaps the actual use, of force. It's hard to dispute Steyn's point that the long-running negotiations between the EU 3 and Iran have accomplished nothing but the further passing of time during which the Iranian nuclear program has advanced. Nor do I see any sensible explanation as to why the threats by the Iranians -- including as Steyn points out, supposed Iranian moderates -- to wipe Israel off the map or to strike a death blow against the Great Satan itself, should not be taken deadly seriously.

What is new and different here is that a nation seeking nuclear weapons is actively threatening to use them in that fashion. Prior to the dissolution of the USSR, the strategic reality was quite different -- both sides threatened to retaliate massively, but there was never any serious notion of using nukes except in response to an attack. Nor is Truman's use of the Bomb against Japan relevant here -- it's just a rhetorical club and a pretty gross one at that.

I have seen some bloggers (see the comment thread on Dan Drezner's site, where he has an open thread devoted to Steyn's piece) suggest that, if the threat is as serious as Steyn argues (I agree with him that it is), then the military response (if there is one) should come from Israel rather than the US. Several others evidently believe that the main threat to peace in the world today is the United States. As they say, it's a point of view.

But however one chooses to read the relevant Cold War history, the key question remains whether it is sensible in a post 9/11 world for either the Americans or the Israelis to wait while this mortal danger gathers. The US has the greater luxury of distance from the immediate source of the problem, but for the reasons Steyn sets forth, distance in today's world isn't much comfort. The Israelis don't even have that, and have every reason to expect that, true to their word, the Iranians will act on their threats. Surely it would be folly, verging on a national death wish, for the Israelis not to base their planning on that basis.

As I read his article, it is ultimately irrelevant to Steyn's argument whether the response to the Iranian drive to acquire nukes is delivered by American or Israeli planes. Nor does it matter what particular form of ordnance is used. (For many reasons, it's not likely to be tactical nukes.) Given the current problems in Israel, it's hard to see how the Israelis could take such action without strong and perhaps public assurances of US support and backing. Given the political realities in the US, it's hard to see Bush's authorizing military action by the US or supporting the Israelis in such a venture against the Iranians until at least the Security Council two-step is played out to its inevitably ineffective conclusion. (If it turns out to be effective, so much the better, but don't hold your breathe on that one.) No one really knows how close the Iranians are to developing a deliverable nuke, but whatever the intelligence may show, there's no realistic set of political circumstances that would shorten that timetable for action.

For the reasons sketched above, I expect that the military response will eventually come from Israel, since two nukes -- one in Tel Aviv and one in Haifa -- would essentially achieve the Iranian objective of wiping Israel off the map. Any response Israel might make after the fact would be pointless in terms of reversing the reality of Isreal's utter destruction, although the Israelis might still deliver such a response. The only option left for Isreal is a preemptive strike. I would be astonished if the Israeli government sees the situation differently.

Some of the snarkier comments about Steyn's article suggested that Steyn's analysis fails to take into account other "reasonable alternatives" short of the use of force that might bring about an acceptable resolution. No such alternatives have been described, and in all events they all boil down to just some variation or combination of two -- more negotiations, to be followed by sanctions. As Steyn says, negotiations have been tried and are a failure. For political reasons, more negotiations will be pursued -- bilateral, through the EU 3, at the UN, etc. There is no reason to think anything useful will come from them, just as nothing useful has come from them to date. Steyn is right to be dismissive in comparing them to another "peace in our time" deal such as the Clinton Administration thought it reached with the N. Koreans. Sanctions are an obvious bad joke -- even assuming the Security Council would ever consider adopting any, which in itself is an unlikely event.

The one element Steyn did not discuss is the time window here. If Bush is succeeded by a Republican (McCain or Guiliani, say), there is no reason to expect a change in US policy on this point. If it's a Democrat, there's every reason to expect a fundamental change. Indeed, it's hard to think of any Democrat with any chance of winning the nomination who would credibly pursue, either directly or in concert with the Israelis, military action against Iran. That political reality is unlikely to escape the notice of the Israelis or the Iranians. What it means is that the Iranians have every reason to string out the negotiations endgame for two more years; and the Israelis may be under considerable pressure to act while Bush is still in office. Those two events -- the need to play out the negotiations for domestic political reasons, and the need for Israel to act while it can still count on US support -- define the time frame in which action against the Iranians is likely if, as Steyn predicts, negotiations go nowhere and force is the only remaining option.

Steyn was clearly right in saying that the choices with regard to Iran come down to bad vs. worse. The fundamental policy choice is whether it makes sense for the Israelis or the US to accept the threat posed by the Iranian drive to acquire the Bomb, against the background of Iranian threats and the irrationality of the pronouncements coming out of the current Iranian regime. Those who think the Iranians are a pacific and misunderstood bunch will be opposed; the flip side of that worldview is that the US is the real threat in the world.  (There are several examples of that point of view on display in the comments on Drezner's thread.)  Those like Steyn who regard 9/11 as a wake-up call to accept the new realities and be willing to act on them, have reached a different conclusion. Count me among the Steynians.

(I posted a version of this diary in the same comment thread on Drezner's blog, and will be interested to see the reaction by the more left-of-center crowd that often comments there.)